Full List of Winners

Lonsec and SuperRatings 2022 Fund of the Year Awards

Lonsec Manager of the Year

Perpetual Asset Management

 

Lonsec Multi-Asset Fund of the Year

Perpetual Diversified Real Return Fund – Class Z units

 

Lonsec Active Global Equity Fund of the Year

Ironbark Royal London Concentrated Global Share Fund

 

Lonsec Active Australian Equity Fund of the Year

DNR Capital Australian Equities High Conviction Fund

 

Lonsec Passive Fund of the Year

Vanguard Australian Shares High Yield ETF

 

Lonsec Active Global Fixed Income Fund of the Year

Ardea Real Outcome Fund

 

Lonsec Active Australian Fixed Income Fund of the Year

Janus Henderson Tactical Income Fund

 

Lonsec Property and Infrastructure Fund of the Year

ClearBridge RARE Infrastructure Income Fund – Hedged

 

Lonsec Alternatives Fund of the Year

PIMCO TRENDS Managed Futures Strategy Fund – Wholesale Class

 

Lonsec Sustainable Fund of the Year

Martin Currie Ethical Income Fund

 

Lonsec Emerging Manager of the Year

Longwave Capital Partners

 

Lonsec Innovation Award

T. Rowe Price Global Impact Equity Fund – I Class

 

SuperRatings Fund of the Year Award

Hostplus

 

SuperRatings MySuper of the Year 

CareSuper

 

SuperRatings MyChoice Super of the Year

Hostplus

 

SuperRatings Pension of the Year

TelstraSuper

 

SuperRatings Career Fund of the Year 

Cbus

 

SuperRatings Momentum Award

HESTA

 

SuperRatings Net Benefit Award

Hostplus

 

SuperRatings Smooth Ride Award

CareSuper

 

SuperRatings Generations Award

Aware Super

 

Lonsec’s Head of Sustainable Investment Research explains how Lonsec reviews the ESG capabilities of Fund Managers. This webinar explains the core elements of the Lonsec review process for ESG, how it is used in our overall rating, and how it differs from our Sustainability Score.

 

 


Tony Adams

Head of Sustainable Investment Research, Lonsec

 

Tony joined Lonsec in March 2019 and is responsible for the ESG assessment of funds across all sectors and as well broad oversight of the assessment of sustainable, ethical, ESG and impact capabilities across managers. He is responsible for Lonsec’s sustainability reporting framework (Lonsec’s BEE’s) for funds.

Prior to joining Lonsec, Tony has had 30 years’ experience in global fixed interest markets, most recently as Head of Global Fixed Interest and Credit at Colonial First State Global Asset Management, where he developed the firm’s global credit capability and oversaw the implementation of ESG across portfolios.

Markets were buoyed in July by data from the US suggesting that inflation may have peaked. All asset classes enjoyed strong returns and we saw a sharp rebound in segments of the market which were previously sold down on the back of inflation fears, such as the technology sector. During the month we observed a sharp reversal in short-term price momentum indicators which turned from red to bright green suggesting market sentiment had turned positive. So, is this the start of the next bull market or is it a false start and more pain is to come?

Despite the uptick in market performance, if we look at the facts, not much has changed. Inflation still remains high, the market continues to price in interest rate rises and there is evidence that the global economy is slowing. While we are starting to see some ‘green shoots’ in terms of the external drivers that have contributed to inflation showing some signs of easing, such as the improvement in global supply chains, the jury is still out as to the effectiveness of the current rate hiking cycle on controlling inflation. Since July the US Federal Reserve has reconfirmed their commitment to rate rises until they see clear evidence of inflation abating. Furthermore, we may see more aggressive quantitative tightening (QT), which in effect seeks to reduce central bank balance sheets to fight inflation. This has resulted in a resumption of market volatility. There are also the ‘X-Factors’ such as the conflict in Ukraine and the resultant pressure on energy prices, as well as the growing tensions between China and the West in relation to Taiwan. Both ‘X-Factor’ events are unpredictable and are contributing to the inflationary pressures we are currently observing.

We at Lonsec still believe that inflation will eventually peak and we may see central banks seek to reduce rates at some point in the coming 12 months as the economy shows further signs of slowing. The global economy is already showing signs of slowing with consumer sentiment falling, certain parts of the market such as construction under increased pressure, and indicators such as PMIs, while still broadly positive, showing signs of weakening. If central banks overshoot in their rate hikes the economic slow down will be more pronounced plunging world economies into a recession.

From a portfolio perspective, we have maintained our neutral asset allocation stance and continue to keep our portfolios relatively diversified. We expect more of the same in the coming six months with markets overreacting to short-term news, be it positive or negative, as markets try to navigate where inflation will land. We are continuing to look for evidence of inflation peaking and subsequent stabilisation of bond yields. Staffing remains an issue across sectors and companies are more hesitant in providing forward guidance. We are also closely watching company earnings. To date, companies have been able to pass on rising costs to the end consumer. However, the extent to which this will continue is yet to be seen.


IMPORTANT NOTICE: This document is published by Lonsec Investment Solutions Pty Ltd ACN 608 837 583, a Corporate Authorised Representative (CAR 1236821) (LIS) of Lonsec Research Pty Ltd ABN 11 151 658 561 AFSL 421 445 (Lonsec Research).  LIS creates the model portfolios it distributes using the investment research provided by Lonsec Research but LIS has not had any involvement in the investment research process for Lonsec Research. LIS and Lonsec Research are owned by Lonsec Holdings Pty Ltd ACN 151 235 406. Please read the following before making any investment decision about any financial product mentioned in this document.

DISCLOSURE AT THE DATE OF PUBLICATION: Lonsec Research receives a fee from the relevant fund manager or product issuer(s) for researching financial products (using objective criteria) which may be referred to in this document. Lonsec Research may also receive a fee from the fund manager or product issuer(s) for subscribing to research content and other Lonsec Research services.  LIS receives a fee for providing the model portfolios to financial services organisations and professionals. LIS’ and Lonsec Research’s fees are not linked to the financial product rating(s) outcome or the inclusion of the financial product(s) in model portfolios. LIS and Lonsec Research and their representatives and/or their associates may hold any financial product(s) referred to in this document, but details of these holdings are not known to the Lonsec Research analyst(s).

WARNINGS: Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. Any express or implied rating or advice presented in this document is limited to general advice and based solely on consideration of the investment merits of the financial product(s) alone, without taking into account the investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs (“financial circumstances”) of any particular person. Before making an investment decision based on the rating or advice, the reader must consider whether it is personally appropriate in light of his or her financial circumstances or should seek independent financial advice on its appropriateness.  If the financial advice relates to the acquisition or possible acquisition of a particular financial product, the reader should obtain and consider the Investment Statement or the Product Disclosure Statement for each financial product before making any decision about whether to acquire the financial product.

DISCLAIMER: No representation, warranty or undertaking is given or made in relation to the accuracy or completeness of the information presented in this document, which is drawn from public information not verified by LIS. The information contained in this document is current as at the date of publication. Financial conclusions, ratings and advice are reasonably held at the time of publication but subject to change without notice. LIS assumes no obligation to update this document following publication. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, LIS and Lonsec Research, their directors, officers, employees and agents disclaim all liability for any error or inaccuracy in, misstatement or omission from, this document or any loss or damage suffered by the reader or any other person as a consequence of relying upon it.

Copyright © 2022 Lonsec Investment Solutions Pty Ltd ACN 608 837 583 (LIS). This document may also contain third party supplied material that is subject to copyright.  The same restrictions that apply to LIS copyrighted material, apply to such third-party content.

The challenges of owning a ‘balanced’ portfolio consisting of equities and bonds is front of mind given the broad market volatility that has occurred in 2022. ‘Balanced’ portfolios can differ in the proportion of growth assets they hold, anywhere from 50% – 70% growth and 30% to 50% defensive assets. For the purposes of Lonsec’s analysis in this thought piece, we have used 60% growth and 40% defensive assets as the benchmark portfolio, consisting of 30% S&P/ASX 200 TR Index, 15% MSCI AC World Index ex Australia NR Index (AUD Hedged), 15% MSCI AC World Index ex Australia TR Index (AUD), 20% Bloomberg AusBond Composite 0 Year Index AUD, and 20% Bloomberg Global Aggregate TR Index (AUD Hedged). This represents a broad and fairly vanilla exposure to 60% equities and 40% bonds.

The so called ‘death of the 60/40 portfolio’ has been raised many times following the GFC. That being said, this portfolio has performed exceptionally well over this period. The average calendar year return from 2009 to 2021 has been 9.3%, with the highest returning year being 17.8% (2019) and the lowest returning year being -0.5% (2018). With volatility mostly at the lower end of historical norms, risk adjusted returns have also been strong. Those adopting a buy and hold, static approach to portfolio construction have generally been well rewarded.

That has all changed this year. ‘Balanced’ portfolio returns have been challenged by the war in Ukraine and central banks that have pivoted more quickly than expected to raising interest rates in response to inflation. Figure 1 shows the extent of the sell-off in 2022. For the calendar year until the end of May, the ‘Balanced’ portfolio is down -7.1%. This is the worst start to a calendar year over the 20-year period assessed. Of course, 2002 and, in particular, 2008 ended with deeper drawdowns and at this stage it is highly uncertain how the rest of 2022 will shape up.

Figure 1

Source: Lonsec iRate, data is calendar year returns for a 60/40 portfolio consisting of 30% S&P/ASX 200 TR Index, 15% MSCI AC World Index ex Australia NR Index (AUD Hedged), 15% MSCI AC World Index ex Australia TR Index (AUD), 20% Bloomberg AusBond Composite 0 Year Index AUD, and 20% Bloomberg Global Aggregate TR Index (AUD Hedged). YTD 2022 as at 31 May 2022.

What is different in the 2022 sell-off is the performance of bonds and the breakdown in diversification benefits that they typically offer to a balanced portfolio. While the concept of diversification, the idea of not putting your eggs all in one basket, is fairly well understood, the concept of correlation is less so. If the returns of two asset classes are correlated it means they move up and down together. If assets are negatively correlated it means when the value of one asset rises, the other falls. Ideally, portfolios should be made up of asset class constituents that have a low correlation to each other so that when parts of the portfolio fall in value, other areas of the portfolio rise in value. A negative correlation between risky assets, such as equities, and risk-free assets, such as bonds, has tended to hold for much of recent history, especially in market stress events. However, in 2022, the correlation between equities and bonds has been positive. As depicted in Figure 2, both asset classes have sold off together this year, whereas in 2002 and 2008, bonds offered diversification benefits to falling equity markets.

Figure 2

Source: Lonsec iRate, 2022 correct as at 31 May 2022.

While the negative correlation between equities and bonds is often written about as if a universal law of investing, figure 3 shows that correlations between the two asset classes certainly aren’t static through time and can be highly sensitive to changes in market conditions and regimes. Rolling one-year correlations have been quite volatile over the 20 year period under assessment. A more medium-term representation, as shown by the rolling three year correlation, shows that the two asset classes were generally negatively correlated in the period from 2002 to 2012, but turned more positive in the last several years and spiked early in 2022. The takeaway from this is that positive correlations between equities and bonds are not necessarily anything new, rather the correlations are time varying in nature. Of course, a positive correlation between the two asset classes is less acceptable when markets are falling as they have been this year.

Figure 3

Source:  Lonsec iRate, for the period January 2022 to May 2022. Equities consists of 50% S&P/ASX 200 TR Index, 25% MSCI AC World Index ex Australia NR Index (AUD Hedged), 25% MSCI AC World Index ex Australia TR Index (AUD). Bonds consists of 50% Bloomberg AusBond Composite 0 Year Index AUD, and 50% Bloomberg Global Aggregate TR Index (AUD Hedged).

What does the future state hold? ‘Regime change’ has become the topic de jour, a term used to describe a structural shift in the economic environment. For much of the last 20-30 years, the environment has been dominated by low inflation (and falling interest rates) and moderate growth, an environment which, all else equal, is favourable for both equities and bonds. Importantly, bonds have been a great diversifier while delivering positive returns.

Conversely, a backdrop of higher inflation (and rising interest rates) and low growth is less favourable for equities and bonds. It is this environment that is dominating markets this year. The duration of these changes is never certain and one can never be certain how long a certain regime will persist. High valuations in both equity and bond markets at the start of this year had certainly made markets more susceptible to a correction when sentiment turned. That being said, markets can be fast moving and naturally reset themselves after periods of extreme market performance. 10 year bond yields in the US and Australia have already priced in a number of rate rises and some multi-asset managers, after a period of little exposure to bonds, are now talking about them offering better value in some circumstances.

While stress in financial markets can be worrying, it is important to focus on your long-term investment strategy and ensure portfolio asset allocations are aligned with your goals and objectives. Figure 5 shows that the variance of shorter-term returns can be wide, however the range of potential outcomes tends to narrow over longer-term time horizons. This highlights the time diversification inherent in many multi-asset portfolios.

Figure 4

  Rolling one-year returns Rolling three year returns p.a. Rolling five year returns p.a. Rolling 10 year returns p.a.
Average annualised return 8.07% 7.77% 7.51% 7.60%
Best annualised return 24.62% 15.82% 12.94% 10.00%
Worst annualised return -20.26% -4.21% 1.29% 5.31%

Source: Lonsec iRate using monthly time series of 60/40 Balanced portfolio from 2002 to May 2022 consisting of 30% S&P/ASX 200 TR Index, 15% MSCI AC World Index ex Australia NR Index (AUD Hedged), 15% MSCI AC World Index ex Australia TR Index (AUD), 20% Bloomberg AusBond Composite 0 Year Index AUD, and 20% Bloomberg Global Aggregate TR Index (AUD Hedged).

Note, the average annualised return of the ‘Balanced’ portfolio is between 7.5% and 8.1% p.a. over each rolling timeframe. For those investors with shorter term time horizons, the range of potential outcomes has been exceptionally wide. An investor withdrawing in November 2008 after one year invested experienced a loss of -20.3%. Somewhat unsurprisingly the strongest 12-month return was in the aftermath of the financial crisis in February 2010 with a return of 24.6%. While an obvious lesson here is that investors tend to be well rewarded for investing at the bottom of the cycle (notwithstanding the difficulties of picking the bottom), a major takeaway is that those invested over longer time horizons have a much narrower range of potential outcomes (somewhat easier than picking when to invest). Rolling 10-year periods over the 20 year time period assessed were in the range of 5.3% and 7.6% p.a. The 5.3% p.a. return was for the 10-year period ending December 2011 and included the drawdowns of 2002 and 2008, highlighting that staying the course can be a valuable strategy in itself when correctly aligned to your risk profile and overall objectives.

The multi-asset universe is exceptionally broad consisting of static asset allocation approaches as referenced in the analysis above, in addition to those taking active asset allocation and/or active security selection decisions. If the forward-looking environment continues to be challenged, multi-asset managers will have to lean on these asset allocation and security selection levers to enhance the risk and return profile of their portfolios. Many multi-asset funds have the flexibility in their mandates to tilt portfolios away from their reference asset class benchmark, in addition to introducing other asset classes within their portfolios to support diversification benefits. Forward looking scenario testing and testing of correlation assumptions may also be part of their investment process. Theoretically, this increases the level of diversification and potential return sources available and allows active managers to be more dynamic in responding to changing market conditions or regimes. Funds with greater asset allocation tools can be useful for investors who require greater certainty in outcomes, are close to or in retirement, or have a specific goal suited to the fund in question.

Key takeaways for multi-asset investors

  1. Investing in the right asset allocation for your risk profile and goals is highly important. This may well be a static asset allocation approach, as is the one described in our analysis, or one that is much more dynamic and tactical in its approach.
  2. Return outcomes over shorter term time horizons can be wide. Investors who are willing to invest over the longer term have tended to be well rewarded for taking risk.
  3. The correlation between equities and bonds is time varying and dependent on market regimes. To date, 2022 has been an exceptionally unusual year in the last 20 years with both equities and bonds selling off together.

IMPORTANT NOTICE: This document is published by Lonsec Research Pty Ltd ABN 11 151 658 561, AFSL No. 421445 (Lonsec). Please read the following before making any investment decision about any financial product mentioned in this document.
Disclosure as at the date of publication: Lonsec receives fees from fund managers or product issuers for researching their financial product(s) using comprehensive and objective criteria. Lonsec receives subscriptions for providing research content to subscribers including fund managers and product issuers. Lonsec receives fees for providing investment consulting advice to clients, which includes model portfolios, approved product lists and other advice. Lonsec’s fees are not linked to the product rating outcome or the inclusion of products in model portfolios, or in approved product lists. Lonsec and its representatives, Authorised Representatives and their respective associates may have positions in the financial product(s) mentioned in this document, which may change during the life of this document, but Lonsec considers such holdings not to be sufficiently material to compromise any recommendation or advice.
Warnings: Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. The information contained in this document is obtained from various sources deemed to be reliable. It is not guaranteed as accurate or complete and should not be relied upon as such. Opinions expressed are subject to change. This document is but one tool to help make investment decisions. The changing character of markets requires constant analysis and may result in changes. Any express or implied rating or advice presented in this document is limited to “General Advice” (as defined in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) and based solely on consideration of the investment merits of the financial product(s) alone, without taking into account the investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs (‘financial circumstances’) of any particular person. It does not constitute a recommendation to purchase, redeem or sell the relevant financial product(s).
Before making an investment decision based on the rating(s) or advice, the reader must consider whether it is personally appropriate in light of his or her financial circumstances, or should seek independent financial advice on its appropriateness. If our advice relates to the acquisition or possible acquisition of particular financial product(s), the reader should obtain and consider the Investment Statement or Product Disclosure Statement for each financial product before making any decision about whether to acquire a financial product. Where Lonsec’s research process relies upon the participation of the fund manager(s) or product issuer(s) and they are no longer an active participant in Lonsec’s research process, Lonsec reserves the right to withdraw the document at any time and discontinue future coverage of the financial product(s).
Disclaimer: This document is for the exclusive use of the person to whom it is provided by Lonsec and must not be used or relied upon by any other person. No representation, warranty or undertaking is given or made in relation to the accuracy or completeness of the information presented in this document, which is drawn from public information not verified by Lonsec. Financial conclusions, ratings and advice are reasonably held at the time of completion but subject to change without notice. Lonsec assumes no obligation to update this document following publication. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, Lonsec, its directors, officers, employees and agents disclaim all liability for any error or inaccuracy in, misstatement or omission from, this document or any loss or damage suffered by the reader or any other person as a consequence of relying upon it.
Copyright © 2022 Lonsec Research Pty Ltd (ABN 11 151 658 561, AFSL No. 421445) (Lonsec). This document is subject to copyright of Lonsec. Except for the temporary copy held in a computer’s cache and a single permanent copy for your personal reference or other than as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), no part of this document may, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, micro-copying, photocopying, recording or otherwise), be reproduced, stored or transmitted without the prior written permission of Lonsec.
This document may also contain third party supplied material that is subject to copyright. Any such material is the intellectual property of that third party or its content providers. The same restrictions applying above to Lonsec copyrighted material, applies to such third party content.

The heat has been on with central banks around the world trying to keep inflation under control. We have seen three consecutive rate rises by the RBA, the most numerous since 2010. We have observed similar monetary policy tightening action in other jurisdictions, notably the US where the last inflation read was 8.6%. Central banks are walking a tightrope as they try to manage inflation while at the same time trying to avoid a material economic slowdown.

One of the challenges is that many of the inflationary pressures we have observed have been driven by supply side issues caused by the pandemic and the subsequent pressure on supply chains. This has been coupled with the war in Ukraine which together have driven up the price of everything from building materials, food and energy costs.

There are some initial signs however that the heat may be coming off some of the areas that have been driving inflation. Globally, there is evidence weaker demand is coming through reflected in weaker PMI figures, opening up some spare capacity and allowing supply conditions to improve. Notably, indicators such as Global Manufacturing PMI supplier delivery times are showing signs of improvement, suggesting goods are beginning to move again and the S&P Global Supply Side Shortages Indicator is easing.

Other signs of the heat coming out of the economy are evident. The most visible and arguably high-profile, given many of us have exposure, is the housing sector. The Australian housing market is showing signs of softening with auction clearance rates at two-year lows according to CoreLogic data. Sydney has recorded the sharpest fall in house prices, falling by 1.6% in June. We have also seen a string of construction companies go into liquidation, the most recent being Langford Jones Homes in Victoria.

It is too early to assess whether rate rises are having their intended effect and whether central banks have the balance right between managing demand and keeping the economy growing. However, there are signs that demand is weakening and that supply chains are slowly working through the ‘covid’ backlog. If we see sustained evidence that inflation has peaked, and bond yields show signs of stability it is plausible that central banks will pause their tightening cycle and we may even see rates come back down next year. Until that time expect more bouts of market volatility as the market attempts to price in expectations on interest rates.

Considering this environment, we have sought to moderate any material asset allocation tilts and well as factor exposures within our suite of portfolios. We are likely to hold this position until we see sustained signs of inflation peaking and rate hiking cycle approach its climax. At that point we will reassess our portfolios positioning.


IMPORTANT NOTICE: This document is published by Lonsec Investment Solutions Pty Ltd ACN 608 837 583, a Corporate Authorised Representative (CAR 1236821) (LIS) of Lonsec Research Pty Ltd ABN 11 151 658 561 AFSL 421 445 (Lonsec Research).  LIS creates the model portfolios it distributes using the investment research provided by Lonsec Research but LIS has not had any involvement in the investment research process for Lonsec Research. LIS and Lonsec Research are owned by Lonsec Holdings Pty Ltd ACN 151 235 406. Please read the following before making any investment decision about any financial product mentioned in this document.

DISCLOSURE AT THE DATE OF PUBLICATION: Lonsec Research receives a fee from the relevant fund manager or product issuer(s) for researching financial products (using objective criteria) which may be referred to in this document. Lonsec Research may also receive a fee from the fund manager or product issuer(s) for subscribing to research content and other Lonsec Research services.  LIS receives a fee for providing the model portfolios to financial services organisations and professionals. LIS’ and Lonsec Research’s fees are not linked to the financial product rating(s) outcome or the inclusion of the financial product(s) in model portfolios. LIS and Lonsec Research and their representatives and/or their associates may hold any financial product(s) referred to in this document, but details of these holdings are not known to the Lonsec Research analyst(s).

WARNINGS: Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. Any express or implied rating or advice presented in this document is limited to general advice and based solely on consideration of the investment merits of the financial product(s) alone, without taking into account the investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs (“financial circumstances”) of any particular person. Before making an investment decision based on the rating or advice, the reader must consider whether it is personally appropriate in light of his or her financial circumstances or should seek independent financial advice on its appropriateness.  If the financial advice relates to the acquisition or possible acquisition of a particular financial product, the reader should obtain and consider the Investment Statement or the Product Disclosure Statement for each financial product before making any decision about whether to acquire the financial product.

DISCLAIMER: No representation, warranty or undertaking is given or made in relation to the accuracy or completeness of the information presented in this document, which is drawn from public information not verified by LIS. The information contained in this document is current as at the date of publication. Financial conclusions, ratings and advice are reasonably held at the time of publication but subject to change without notice. LIS assumes no obligation to update this document following publication. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, LIS and Lonsec Research, their directors, officers, employees and agents disclaim all liability for any error or inaccuracy in, misstatement or omission from, this document or any loss or damage suffered by the reader or any other person as a consequence of relying upon it.

Copyright © 2022 Lonsec Investment Solutions Pty Ltd ACN 608 837 583 (LIS). This document may also contain third party supplied material that is subject to copyright.  The same restrictions that apply to LIS copyrighted material, apply to such third-party content.

With a huge array of government initiatives reshaping super in recent years, none was more keenly watched than the inaugural performance test of 80 MySuper products.

The regulator found that 13 of the 80 products assessed were deemed to have underperformed the benchmark by more than 50 basis points. Since August when the results were released, 77% of these providers have announced their intentions to either merge or exit the industry.

This year, we expect to see the second round of MySuper results likely causing some MySuper solutions to be prevented from accepting new members. This will be accompanied by the first assessment of Choice options under the test. SuperRatings has conducted analysis of the industry’s performance to 31 March 2022, using its newly developed Performance Test iQ tool. Analysis was completed on over 650 options across Trustee Directed Products, including Retail, Industry, Corporate, and Government funds, excluding MySuper products.

The results from our analysis suggest that approximately 20% of options were estimated to fail the test, which allows for annualised underperformance of the benchmark of up to 50 basis points.

Option Type % Estimated to Fail
Capital Stable (20-40) 25%
Conservative Balanced (41-59) 20%
Balanced (60-76) 17%
Growth (77-90) 16%
High Growth (91-100) 26%

Breaking down the analysis further, SuperRatings found that all option types are facing challenges. In particular, options with growth assets, such as equities, making up between 91-100% of assets held were most likely to fail the test, with 26% of these options estimated as failing based on performance over the 8 years to 31 March 2022. Capital Stable options with between 20-40% growth assets are also facing a challenge to pass the test, with around a quarter of these options estimated as failing.

As the performance test captures investment returns over an eight-year period, funds have limited ability to shift their relative long-term position against the benchmark. However, with the test only accounting for the most recent level of fees charged, funds do have the ability to make fee changes to improve their performance test outcomes.

SuperRatings has been tracking an estimate of the benchmark representative administration fees and expenses (RAFE) based on the performance test calculation. While the test appears to be having an impact in terms of reducing fees for the MySuper products which were tested last year, our analysis shows that the Trustee Directed Product RAFE has remained flat.

 

We observed a decline in the RAFE for MySuper products each quarter since the start of the financial year, however the Trustee Directed Product RAFE saw an increase in the September quarter, followed by a return to the same RAFE in December 2021 and has remained stable since.

Since the results of the first test were published, we have observed an increase in funds seeking to simplify their investment menus, as well as a faster pace of merger announcements and shorter times for mergers to reach completion. While there are clear cost savings for funds in managing fewer options, the benefits of member choice are real, with highly engaged members particularly valuing additional choice. We suggest funds take a balanced approach when assessing the viability of offering additional options to ensure members achieve the best possible retirement outcomes.

The first performance test has had a significant impact on the future of those products which failed. Having an industry wide benchmark gives funds a clear target with significant potential benefit for members, however ensuring the test is appropriately capturing the nuances of the range of investment options in the industry remains a challenge. The regulator will be releasing the results of its second annual performance test later this year, with the industry closely monitoring potential outcomes. As the industry awaits the results of the second test, SuperRatings continues to use its comprehensive database and deep research capability to gain key insights into super fund performance and the future outlook for the industry.

In this video, Lukasz de Pourbaix, Executive Director and CIO of Lonsec Investment Solutions provides an update on what’s been happening in the markets, with market volatility and inflation. Lukasz then explains what this means for the Lonsec portfolios.


IMPORTANT NOTICE: This document is published by Lonsec Investment Solutions Pty Ltd ACN 608 837 583, a Corporate Authorised Representative (CAR 1236821) (LIS) of Lonsec Research Pty Ltd ABN 11 151 658 561 AFSL 421 445 (Lonsec Research).  LIS creates the model portfolios it distributes using the investment research provided by Lonsec Research but LIS has not had any involvement in the investment research process for Lonsec Research. LIS and Lonsec Research are owned by Lonsec Holdings Pty Ltd ACN 151 235 406. Please read the following before making any investment decision about any financial product mentioned in this document.

DISCLOSURE AT THE DATE OF PUBLICATION: Lonsec Research receives a fee from the relevant fund manager or product issuer(s) for researching financial products (using objective criteria) which may be referred to in this document. Lonsec Research may also receive a fee from the fund manager or product issuer(s) for subscribing to research content and other Lonsec Research services.  LIS receives a fee for providing the model portfolios to financial services organisations and professionals. LIS’ and Lonsec Research’s fees are not linked to the financial product rating(s) outcome or the inclusion of the financial product(s) in model portfolios. LIS and Lonsec Research and their representatives and/or their associates may hold any financial product(s) referred to in this document, but details of these holdings are not known to the Lonsec Research analyst(s).

WARNINGS: Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. Any express or implied rating or advice presented in this document is limited to general advice and based solely on consideration of the investment merits of the financial product(s) alone, without taking into account the investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs (“financial circumstances”) of any particular person. Before making an investment decision based on the rating or advice, the reader must consider whether it is personally appropriate in light of his or her financial circumstances or should seek independent financial advice on its appropriateness.  If the financial advice relates to the acquisition or possible acquisition of a particular financial product, the reader should obtain and consider the Investment Statement or the Product Disclosure Statement for each financial product before making any decision about whether to acquire the financial product.

DISCLAIMER: No representation, warranty or undertaking is given or made in relation to the accuracy or completeness of the information presented in this document, which is drawn from public information not verified by LIS. The information contained in this document is current as at the date of publication. Financial conclusions, ratings and advice are reasonably held at the time of publication but subject to change without notice. LIS assumes no obligation to update this document following publication. Except for any liability which cannot be excluded, LIS and Lonsec Research, their directors, officers, employees and agents disclaim all liability for any error or inaccuracy in, misstatement or omission from, this document or any loss or damage suffered by the reader or any other person as a consequence of relying upon it.

Copyright © 2022 Lonsec Investment Solutions Pty Ltd ACN 608 837 583 (LIS). This document may also contain third party supplied material that is subject to copyright.  The same restrictions that apply to LIS copyrighted material, apply to such third-party content.

A look at Chinese equity managers’ performance over 18 months to March 2022.

To say that the last several months have been difficult for the investment landscape within China would be an understatement. For the 18 months ending March 2022, the MSCI China NR Index (measured in AUD) has returned -28.7% on a cumulative basis. On a monthly basis, the Index has ended in red in 11 of the 18 monthly periods. Given China’s prominence in the Emerging markets and Asia ex Japan Indices, performance for these broader Indices (measured in AUD) also remained weak generating cumulative returns of 3.6% and -0.8% respectively. The period was marked by a series of regulatory developments, each one more extreme than the prior in terms of testing investor patience, discipline, and appetite for Chinese equities. The ‘common prosperity’ theme, a rhetoric increasingly promoted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during this time, permeated strongly in all instances.

This report looks to delve into the key developments within China over the analysed period (October 2020 to March 2022), analyse the evolution of Chinese/Hong Kong stock holdings and the aggregate allocation of a majority of Lonsec’s Global and Emerging Markets equities rated universe alongside the associated performance outcomes for the period. It concludes with an outlook of the investment landscape moving forwards.

Thunder, lightning, and everything frightening!

A quick Covid-19 recovery through early and mid-2020 led the Chinese market to surpass its 2015 highs of US$10trn ($14trn). However, the euphoria quickly fizzled out as the first wave of regulatory crackdowns surfaced. After a four-month anti-monopoly probe, Chinese regulators fined Alibaba a record RMB 18bn (US$2.75bn) and suspended (eventually cancelled) the upcoming IPO of its financial arm, Ant Group to tackle a long simmering problem in the tech sector: anti-competitive practices. During this time, China enforced an antitrust guideline for the “platform economy” giving more teeth to the first major revisions made to the Antitrust Law (the second public consultation was completed in November 2021) in 13 years. A new antitrust bureau was also launched in November 2020, responsible for conducting antitrust investigations and oversight into M&A activities and market competition.

The subsequent sell-off in internet stocks, although initially short lived, signalled the start of a sharp reversal of a long-term uptrend of large cap technology companies. Throughout the year, other internet conglomerates including Tencent, Baidu, ByteDance, Meituan and Didi Chuxing were also fined for violating the anti-monopoly law resulting in significant share price corrections.

The interventions were not isolated to the technology sector however, reforms also took place in the education, online gaming and property sectors precipitated by a desire to prioritise social stability and common prosperity objectives. The education sector bore the full brunt of policy actions in July 2021 when the State Council released the ‘double reduction’ policy guidelines to address the burden of an excessively competitive academic success culture. The stipulations contained within overhauled the entire industry structure effectively transforming it into a non-profit sector overnight and resulting in a swarm of tutoring companies going bankrupt. Share prices of the three largest players New oriental education, TAL education and Gaotu techedu fell 54%, 71% and 63% respectively on the day of the announcements and have since been effectively worthless (down 92% on average for the 12-months ending April 2022).

Besides taking aim at the education sector, China’s focus on the growth and development of the next generation also spilt over to the online game industry. In August 2021, China limited the amount of time children can spend on video games to avoid gaming addiction, which may harm their academic and personal development. This had significant implications for the world’s largest online gaming market and materially impacted the fortunes of companies such as Tencent and NetEase.

Volatility returned in the last quarter of 2021, as the property sector, a key driver of economic growth, local government funding, and investment savings for a large portion of the Chinese population, succumbed to stringent policies to curb speculation and credit expansion. The latest rules included further restrictions on developer financing and home purchases, serving a significant blow to the overall industry. Additionally, China Evergrande, one of China’s biggest real estate developers, found itself in a headline-making liquidity crisis eventually defaulting on US$1.2bn of its offshore debt, followed quickly by other lower quality developers.

The flurry of negative headlines has continued well into 2022. Chinese equities have underperformed for the most part in the first quarter of the year due to several domestic and external events hitting the market simultaneously. Key factors contributing to this have been a combination of macro / policy headwinds including further regulatory reforms in key sectors, rising geopolitical tensions with the US, re-escalation of American Depository Receipts (ADR) delisting risks, surging Covid-19 cases and China’s rigid ‘zero Covid’ response plan, and more recently the Russia-Ukraine conflict which presents a real threat to global growth.

Navigating the tides…

For investment managers with significant exposure to China, the period was challenging to say the least. The table below looks at performance and portfolio allocation to China/Hong Kong for a manager peer group of 31 products across both Emerging Markets / Regional Asia and Global Equity sectors (26 and 5 respectively) between the months of October 2020 to March 2022. During the 18-month period, the peer group delivered an average cumulative return of -0.2% (median 0.3%). On a quarter end basis between September 2020 to March 2022, the region’s representation in the benchmark Indices declined meaningfully, from 46% to 42% in MSCI Asia ex Japan, from 42% to 30% in MSCI Emerging Markets, and from 6% to 4% in the MSCI AC World Indices.

In terms of performance, on a subsector basis, global large cap managers with a significant exposure to China (>10% on average) within the peer group produced the weakest outcomes; an average cumulative return of -6.2%. Regional Asia and Global Emerging Markets managers within the peer group generated an average cumulative return of -1.1% and 2.6% respectively. Relative underperformance was tilted towards managers with higher exposure to offshore listed companies in Hong Kong and US listed ADRs which fell indiscriminately during this period. By contrast, managers who held onshore China A shares delivered stronger returns on the back of many sectors doing well. Within the Regional Asia cohort, managers with exposures to large cap growth names and sectors most severely impacted by the regulations faced headwinds while managers with a greater skew towards small and mid-caps, especially those linked to the green economy and the domestication of supply chains, benefitted during this time. And finally, performance fortunes tilted towards valuation sensitive Global Emerging Markets managers who either drastically rebalanced away from consumer and technology sectors at the start of the year or were already underweight these sectors.

Nearly all products within the peer group saw a reduction in their absolute portfolio allocation to China/Hong Kong to varying degrees depending on the performance of underlying holdings and their relative investment outlook. The exceptions to this were the Lazard Global Emerging Markets and FSSA Global Emerging Markets Focus funds where the ending allocation remained fairly consistent with that at the start of the period and the Pendal Asian Share Fund which saw an increase in its allocation. Nevertheless, all three products remained underweight relative to their respective Indices during this time.

On an aggregate basis, Global Equity managers with significant exposures to China demonstrated the largest adjustment to their absolute portfolio allocation to the region, followed by their Global Emerging Markets counterparts. The Global Equity peer group maintained an average quarterly weight of 17% relative to the 5% weight in the MSCI AC World Index. However, notably towards the end of March 2022, large cap quality / GARP and quality / growth managers such as Magellan and DSM capital fully divested their portfolio holdings on account of growing political and regulatory uncertainties.

Global Emerging Markets peers maintained a mean portfolio holding of 28% relative to 36% in the Index. The biggest change in ending allocation was in GQG Partners Emerging Markets Equity and Legg Mason Martin Currie Emerging Markets funds where absolute holdings to China/Hong Kong declined from 43% to 15% and 37% to 26% respectively. During this period, the group had only a small subset of managers that remained overweight relative to the Index (between 1 and 4 at any point in time). This included Vanguard Active Emerging Markets Equity and Abrdn Standard Emerging Markets Equity funds which held a 7% and 4% relative overweight to the Index at the end of March 2022 respectively. This was backed by a positive view on high quality growth names in the region and/or the prospect of a counter cyclical recovery. The group also included the Warakirri Global Emerging Markets Fund which held a 0% weight to China and a 10-11% weight to Hong Kong (primarily a global industrials exports business, Techtronic Industries) during this time.

The Regional Asia cohort maintained a mean exposure of 45% relative to 47% in the MSCI AC Asia ex Japan Index. The biggest change in allocation was in Cooper Investors Asian Equities and Mirae Asset Asia Great Consumer Equity funds, where holdings declined from 62% to 34% and 61% to 46% respectively. Several managers in this group maintained an overweight relative to the Index during the period, ranging between 5 to 9 managers at any point in time (7 as of March 2022). This included GARP style Cooper Investors and Mirae Asset funds, value style Premium Asia and core / style neutral Schroders Asia Pacific and Fidelity Asia funds which were c. 13-16% overweight at the start of October 2020. Of these, Cooper Investors experienced the largest decline, ending the period at a -8% relative underweight, while the remaining maintained their overweight positions to varying degrees despite a reduction in absolute allocations.

The following table lists stocks that saw the largest change in their representation across the peer group’s portfolios on a quarter end basis between October 2020 to March 2022. Large cap technology names such as Alibaba and Tencent that had previously benefitted from nearly a decade of tailwinds from the consumption growth thematic, both from both global and local investors, saw a sharp decline in their portfolio representation during this time. Insurance giants AIA group and Ping An were next in line as investors wary of the growing property sector woes sold the names frantically. Also struggling were technology stock JD.Com and delivery giant Meituan who faced ongoing anti-monopoly and competitive threats. Other notable mentions included exits in the ill-fated New oriental education which succumbed to the regulatory pressures and CNOOC which was placed on an economic blacklist by the US.

Stocks that have seen increasing representation in manager portfolios include names directly benefitting from a transition to a green economy, expanding domestic consumption and those linked to the broader strategic aims of the CCP such increasing self-reliance in semi-conductor manufacturing. Notably, given currently depressed valuations and forecasts of better medium to long term returns, there has also been a renewed interest in names like Alibaba and Meituan after their tremendous fall from glory.

Smoother sails ahead?

Having battled through monumental challenges over the last several months, investors have rightly been concerned about the future of the Chinese investment landscape. Risks of ongoing covid induced lockdowns, slowing growth, further regulatory interventions, and escalating geopolitical political tensions have been at the forefront of investment discussions. Given this backdrop, the CCP’s ‘Two Sessions’ meeting last month in March has provided investors with valuable insights into the government’s plan to promote stable growth in the region. Key priorities for 2022 include a GDP growth target of 5.5% with a CPI target of around 3%. This growth target is at the higher end of the market expectations range and emphasizes the government’s pro-growth policy stance. It also highlights the significance of 2022 as a politically important year for president Xi Jinping who is poised to extend his term as party chief for a precedent-breaking third time during the CCP national congress in the latter half of this year. In saying that, Lonsec considers these short-term targets to be ambitious and critically dependent on key aspects such as easing of lockdown restrictions and a more relaxed Covid approach.

Longer term, in Lonsec’s view, the regulatory storm appears to have subsided. In March 2022, Vice Premier Liu He addressed key market concerns and called for order and transparency in dealings with big tech firms. Alibaba’s share price subsequently rebounded by 65% showing the significance of this speech. Policymakers have demonstrated an urgency to reverse the liquidity crunch currently faced by quality developers and restore consumer confidence in the property sector. Regulators have also been working with the US SEC to resolve the data requirements for Chinese companies to remain listed in the US. Finally, the government has moved to provide monetary and fiscal stimulus at a time when the rest of the world is struggling with rampant inflation which has led to an increased risk of stagflation. On the back of these announcements in April 2022, Chinese equities generated 1.4% (as measured by the MSCI China NR Index AUD) recouping some of the losses experienced during the earlier month.

Valuations in China are currently attractive with many companies trading at historically low multiples and several managers in the peer group remain optimistic on future investment prospects. As of the end of March 2022, managers in the peer group held a considerable allocation to the region (29% on average). In the months to come Lonsec expects markets risks to abate further, albeit volatility and risk premiums may remain elevated for some time. Also given the recency of regulatory developments, some parts of the market such as the internet, education, healthcare may see a lower return profile over the medium term. However, high-quality companies in China with new growth drivers such as the green economy, improved mental and physical health of the nation, and inward-focused technology replacement programmes, for example in semi-conductors are expected to grow rapidly.

Note – an abridged version of this article was originally published in The Australian newspaper on Friday, 27 May 2022. 

IMPORTANT NOTICE: This document is published by Lonsec Research Pty Ltd ABN 11 151 658 561, AFSL No. 421445 (Lonsec). Please read the following before making any investment decision about any financial product mentioned in this document.
Disclosure as at the date of publication: Lonsec receives fees from fund managers or product issuers for researching their financial product(s) using comprehensive and objective criteria. Lonsec receives subscriptions for providing research content to subscribers including fund managers and product issuers. Lonsec receives fees for providing investment consulting advice to clients, which includes model portfolios, approved product lists and other advice. Lonsec’s fees are not linked to the product rating outcome or the inclusion of products in model portfolios, or in approved product lists. Lonsec and its representatives, Authorised Representatives and their respective associates may have positions in the financial product(s) mentioned in this document, which may change during the life of this document, but Lonsec considers such holdings not to be sufficiently material to compromise any recommendation or advice.
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Originally published in The Australian, 7 May 2022

This article presents the views of Alan Dupont and do not necessarily reflect those of Lonsec.

The ripple effects of the Russo-Ukrainian war are spreading and intensifying. Deglobalisation will jeopardise the prosperity and welfare of millions.

The ripple effects of the Russo-Ukrainian war are spreading and intensifying. Their impact is being felt in almost every corner of the globe, revealing an international system under duress.

The US-led rules-based order has survived and prospered for 77 years through numerous regional conflicts, terrorist outrages and economic shocks. But this time it’s different. Although not the sole cause, the Ukraine conflict is driving a once-in-a-century redesign of the world’s economic and geopolitical plumbing.

Like a once-proud liner battered by countless storms, the old order is in danger of listing, beset by numerous cascading external crises. The threat of nuclear war has increased and the world is rearming as security concerns grow. Food and energy spikes are jeopardising economic recovery, fuelling inflation and shaking up global supply chains already disrupted by Covid-19 and the  accelerating decoupling of the US and Chinese economies. Climate change is complicating energy choices. Trade and financial power are being weaponised. Protectionist sentiment is on the rise. All this is morphing into a system-altering super-crisis. There will be no return to normal service.

The emerging world order will be messier, less stable and more contested than the last, with neither autocratic nor democratic states in charge. The world is again beginning to divide into competing economic and geopolitical blocs, one aligned with the US, another with China, and a European grouping that will be primarily, but not wholly, in the US camp. A fourth group of developing countries may try to maintain their independence from the dominant blocs in a futile attempt to reenergise the moribund non-aligned movement. Non-alignment won’t be a viable option if larger nations continue to flex their muscles.

But the most far-reaching consequence will be the end of globalisation as we have known it. The Russo-Ukrainian war has set in motion deglobalisation forces “that could have profound and unpredictable effects”, OECD chief economist Laurence Boone says. Harvard political economist Dani Rodrik agrees. The war has “probably put a nail in the coffin of hyperglobalisation”, he says.

Peterson Institute for International Economics president Adam Posen writes in US policy journal Foreign Affairs that globalisation has been steadily corroding since its high point at the turn of the century. The reasons? Populists and nationalists “have erected barriers to free trade, investment, immigration and the spread of ideas”. China’s challenge to “the rules-based international economic system and to longstanding security arrangements in Asia has encouraged the West to erect barriers to Chinese economic integration”. Posen says the Russian invasion of Ukraine and resulting sanctions “will now make this corrosion even worse”.

So do John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge in a penetrating analysis for Bloomberg News of the consequences of globalisation’s failure. They write that Chinese President Xi Jinping has spent much of his rule building a Sino-centric economic order on the back of his trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative that spans half the globe. The invasion will harden Xi’s determination to reduce China’s dependence on the West, fortified by the “wolf pack” of young Chinese nationalists around him. The breadth and speed of Western sanctions against Russia “is another powerful argument for self-sufficiency”.

But there is a deeper reason: the rise of geoeconomics. First coined in 1990 by American strategist Edward Luttwak to describe the willingness of states to use economic and financial power for geopolitical purposes, geoeconomics has become a preferred tool of statecraft. A recent Deutsche Bank report concludes that as great power competition becomes more pronounced, “geoeconomics is likely to be the tool of first resort in addressing international conflicts”.

The use of economic warfare to achieve geopolitical ends is not new. Trade blockades were a feature of the Napoleonic Wars. Autocratic German regimes weaponised trade policy in the first half of the 20th century to achieve global influence. Pre-World War II Germany was a “power trader”, manipulating trade for strategic and commercial advantage. In more recent times, economic statecraft has become an integral part of a distinctive Chinese approach to foreign policy in which economic and trade coercion is used to cement China’s place as a leading global power. During the past decade more than 27 countries, including Australia, have been on the receiving end of such coercion.

Much to the surprise and chagrin of China and Russia, the US has taken geoeconomics to another level using its economic and financial clout to devastating effect in support of Ukraine. About $US300bn of Russia’s $US640bn ($899bn) in gold and foreign exchange reserves have been frozen.

Once considered the “nuclear option”, the US and its allies have cut off Russia from the SWIFT international payment system and the central institutions of global finance, including the International Monetary Fund and all foreign banks. Russia also has been slapped with the most comprehensive sanctions levied against a significant economy. Unlike earlier sanctions against Iran, Venezuela and North Korea, they are being used against a major exporter of food and energy. Only the US has the financial power to make these sanctions work. But they also require an unprecedented degree of co-ordination among Western allies. “It is the alliance, not the finance, that has mattered,” says Posen. Freezing the Russian Central Bank’s reserves works only if Europe is on board.

If China invaded Taiwan, could the US opt for a hard decoupling and prevent China from accessing the 60 per cent of its $US3 trillion foreign reserves held in US dollars? This might be a bridge too far because of the reciprocal costs China could impose and the collateral damage to the US and global economies. A report last year by the US Chamber of Commerce assessed that a soft decoupling would cost the country at least $US500bn of lost gross domestic product, equating to a 2.5 per cent drop in the US economy.

Cornell University academic Nicholas Mulder, author of The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War, estimates a hard decoupling could collapse US GDP by 5 per cent, about $US1 trillion – a bigger shock than Covid in 2020.

Still, the speed and severity of Western sanctions stunned Chinese officials, drawing criticism. Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng said “globalisation should not be weaponised”, seemingly oblivious to the arbitrary economic and financial punishment his own country has meted out to other nations across the past decade. “We are shocked,” economist and former adviser to the People’s Bank of China Yu Yongding told Nikkei Asia. “We never expected the US would freeze a country’s foreign currency reserves one day. And this action has fundamentally undermined national credibility in the international monetary system. Now the question is, if the US stops playing by the rules, what can China do to guarantee the safety of its foreign assets?”

The short answer is that Beijing’s options are limited. Despite its financial heft, the yuan is not fully convertible like the US dollar or euro and accounts for only 2 per cent of global payments. Beijing could mitigate the risk by persuading BRI members to use the yuan instead of the dollar, opening the door for others to follow suit. Saudi Arabia is already considering oil sales to China that would be transacted in yuan. And Russian and Chinese officials are working to connect their countries’ financial messaging systems to circumvent the Western-controlled SWIFT. These measures aren’t likely to dethrone the US dollar in the short term, although that won’t stop China and fellow autocrats from trying.

The conclusion of financial analyst Cissy Zhou is that the global financial landscape is set to become more volatile. Sanctioned countries may choose to side with their own bloc for trading and investment. Russia has demanded that Poland and Bulgaria pay for its gas in roubles, not dollars, and has called on its fellow BRICS emerging economies (Brazil, India, China and South Africa) to extend the use of national currencies for international payments to dilute the dollar’s power. If the West continues to impose financial sanctions on the non-democratic world a dualtrack system in global finance could well emerge.

None of this is comforting. Sanctions and embargoes may be preferable to war, but the increased use of geoeconomics is bad news for globalisation. It will discourage economic integration, free trade and technological innovation, leading to lower growth, trade barriers, protectionism and a shrinking of the global economic commons. “What we’re headed toward is a more divided world economically that will mirror what is clearly a more divided world politically,” Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Edward Alden says. “I don’t think economic integration survives a period of political disintegration.”

Despite recent bad press and widespread belief that globalisation has benefited elites at the expense of the less fortunate, economic liberalism has lifted more than a billion people out of poverty and enriched many lives. Access to goods and services, international travel, instant communications and advances in almost every field of human endeavour are some obvious benefits. World trade in manufactured goods doubled in the 1990s and doubled again in the 2000s.

A geopolitically and economically divided world could ignite another world war just as the end of the first age of globalisation culminated in World War I. Beggar-thy-neighbour tariffs and power trading more than halved international trade between 1928 and 1933, leading to the Depression and World War II. Only after 1945 did economic integration resume its advance – and then only in the Western half of the map.

“What most of us today think of as globalisation only began in the 1980s, with the arrival of Thatcherism and Reaganism, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reintegration of China into the world economy and, in 1992, the creation of the European single market,” Micklethwait and Wooldridge write.

A reversal of globalisation will not sweep away the world we know. But it will slow progress, jeopardising the prosperity and welfare of millions of people in the developed and developing worlds. Deglobalisation will hurt Russia and curtail China’s power. Their quest to insulate themselves from sanctions by turning inward will sap the dynamism of their economies and reverse decades of progress. It won’t be good for the West either, particularly trade-dependent states such as Australia. The Western order assumes free trade and greater economic interdependence lessens the risk of war. This belief drove the Western victors of World War II to create an order that would unite victors and vanquished in a shared economic and political future.

As the second age of globalisation begins to buckle, the challenge for US President Joe Biden is to build a constituency for a new world order that preserves globalisation’s enriching features, creates wealth, bolsters the alliance, and exposes the excesses and failings of the authoritarian alternative. As an ally and significant middle power, Australia must take the lead in urging the US and like-minded countries to resist the false lure of protectionism and the fragmentation of the world into competing blocs. Avoiding this dystopian future will require a fresh narrative and strategy.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s no-limits barbarism has had the unintended consequence of reuniting polarised democracies. This new sense of unity, Micklethwait and Wooldridge write, “is no longer confined to the metropolitan elite. One of the great problems with modern liberalism of the past few decades has been its lack of a gripping narrative and a compelling cast of heroes and villains. Globalists have talked a bloodless language of ‘comparative advantage’ and ‘nontariff barriers’, while populists have talked about sneering elites and hidden conspiracies. Now Putin has inadvertently reversed all that. Freedom is the creed of heroes such as (Ukrainian President Volodymyr) Zelensky; anti-liberalism is the creed of monsters who drop bombs on children.”

But a narrative without a strategy is like a car without an engine. The strategy should have two main purposes: hardening the resolve and ability of the Western alliance to withstand further adventurism from Putin and his authoritarian soulmates; and deepening the economic integration of like-minded countries through an inclusive reglobalisation. This should leave no one behind and the door open to autocracies. But only if they are prepared to respect the rules of an international order from which they have gained enormously.

Although Biden has exceeded expectations in rebuilding the alliance and coaxing Europeans to take more responsibility for their own security, he has failed to bind economically America’s European and Asian allies with cross-regional trade deals. A central aim of our foreign and trade policy should be to persuade Biden to advocate for free trade by committing his country to high-standard free trade deals that offer tangible benefits to vacillating non-democracies as well as the developed West. Joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership linked to a redesigned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership would be a good start.

As Micklethwait and Wooldridge observe, the US “won the last Cold War peacefully because it united the free world behind it. This is the way to win the next one peacefully as well. Put together the free world’s economic potential – the EU, North America, Latin America’s biggest economies and the democracies of Asia – and it can do more than see off the autocracies; it can pull them towards freedom.”

There is no more important task for the next government than persuading the Biden administration to advocate for an inclusive reglobalisation. Re-designing economic liberalism to make it more sustainable, egalitarian and interconnected is the best way of reversing the worrying descent into war, conflict and division.

Alan Dupont is chief executive of geopolitical risk consultancy The Cognoscenti Group and a Lowy Institute nonresident fellow.

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Fixed Income is added to a broad portfolio of assets for several reasons. They include:

  • Return: Frequent income from the cash flows of the coupon or interest payments to stabilise the risk and return of your client’s portfolio.
  • Defensive: Capital Preservation. The relatively steady return of capital of fixed-income products (unless there is a credit event default with particular debt security) can partly offset losses from a decline in share prices.
  • Risk Diversification: Broadening the opportunity set in a multi-asset portfolio to diversify risk.

Although there are many benefits to fixed income products, as with all investments, there are several risks investors should be aware of.

  • Credit and Default Risk: Federal, State, and Semi-Government bonds and securities have the backing of the relevant Government. Whereas, corporate bonds, are backed by the financial viability of the underlying company. Should a company declare bankruptcy, bondholders have a higher claim on company assets than do common shareholders. Bonds with credit ratings below BBB are of lower quality and considered below investment grade or junk bonds
  • Interest Rate Risk: This risk happens in an environment like now whereby market interest rates are rising, and the price paid by the bond falls behind. In this case, the bond would lose value in the secondary bond market if sold or market to market on a daily basis like share prices.
  • Market Risk: The prices of bonds (like shares) can increase and decrease over the life of the bond. If the investor holds the bond until its maturity, the price movements are immaterial since the investor will be paid the par face value (usually the 100 cents in the dollar) of the bond upon maturity. However, if the bondholder sells the bond before its maturity through a broker or financial institution in the secondary market, the investor will receive the current market price at the time of the sale. The selling price could result in a gain or loss on the bond investment depending on the underlying corporation, the coupon interest rate, and the current market interest rate.
  • Inflation Risk: Inflationary risk is also a danger to fixed-income investors. The pace at which prices rise in the economy is called inflation. If inflation increases, it eats into the gains of fixed income securities. For example, if fixed-rate debt security pays a 3% return and inflation rises by 5%, the investor loses out, earning only a -2% return in real terms.

What’s Better for Fixed Income Investors when Interest Rates are Rising?

During a period of rising interest rates (yields) fixed-income investments that pay a fixed rate of interest, such as bonds are not helpful, for two reasons:

Firstly, there is an inverse relationship between a bond’s price and its yield – as interest rates increase, bonds fall in value, so bondholders can face capital losses if the bonds are sold prior to maturity. If not sold prior to maturity and they do not default, you get the original par value back plus interest.

Secondly, the income stream from fixed-rate bonds remains the same until maturity. However, as inflation rises, the purchasing power of the interest payments declines.

Investments that pay a floating rate of return are likely to be better off in an inflationary environment, as the interest rate they pay is adjusted periodically such as every 90 days to reflect market rates. If interest rates rise, the interest paid by the investment should also increase at the next reset date. Investors in these types of securities and products do like interest rate hikes as they have very little interest rate duration (or term) risk.

Inflation is generally regarded as damaging to holders of cash and cash equivalents securities or products since the value of cash usually does not keep pace with the increased price of goods and services.

Strategies Employed by Lonsec’s Managers For Diversifying Fixed Income Portfolios During a Climate of Rising inflation and Interest rates

Typically, you take into consideration the client’s return, risk, time horizon, and liquidity expectations.

Usually, such a portfolio is expected to have a minimum time horizon of three years and provide monthly or quarterly income with a level of liquidity to pay their monthly retirement benefits with minimal impact on their capital.

The anchor for the fixed income portfolio is an active fund manager with a core portfolio of investment-grade coupon-paying bonds that continually mature at par into the next series of bonds. In the current investment climate, these active managers have already taken defensive positions by reducing interest rate risk in the portfolio to below benchmark levels of duration and rotating into higher quality rated bonds.  Yes, the daily mark to market price will fluctuate and I have seen portfolios of fixed-rate bonds in some cases now down 8% over one year to the end of April 2022. However, the fixed income portfolio manager is unlikely to sell them before maturity (assuming fund flows are unchanged), and if the bonds don’t default you will get your par value principle back. As the current bond market correction continues in a typical once-a-decade event now is not the time to crystalize your mark to market paper losses. Continue to focus on your three-year strategy and the fund manager will wait for the opportune time to add interest rate risk to core bond holdings when the economic growth fundamentals start to slow and suggest inflationary pressures have peaked. By then the yields and the carry will be much higher in the portfolio.

The next part of the portfolio is your non-core strategies to enhance your income yield with some additional sub-sector strategies including credit, emerging markets, securitised assets.

Within these sub-sectors, it is important to note the following strategies. During this rate hike period floating-rate (or variable investment) strategies will do better than fixed-rate strategies as short-term rates rise due to the regular monthly or quarterly rate reset higher. Remember Floating Rate Portfolio Managers want short-term interest rates to go higher so they can pass on the higher income to their investors. Since you have a diversified portfolio of strategies this component of your portfolio will do well.

In terms of credit strategies, your typical credit manager will also be already defensively positioned. it is important in terms of capital preservation and market volatility to be higher up the capital structure in senior or senior secured debt rather than unsecured debt or hybrids. If interest rates rise too quickly and too high for an extended period, economic growth slows then the level of defaults is at risk of rising. Better to have a bias towards secured debt whereby you are protected by mortgaged assets. Also, the further up the capital structure you are the equity market beta reduces. What that means is debt lower down the capital structure usually moves in about a 0.7 correlation with equity prices. So, if equity or equities go down say 10% in price, lower down the capital structure debt such as unsecured or hybrids may go down an estimated 7% in price terms (and the reverse happens when share prices are rising and the Fund manager rotates down the capital structure). So, the credit fund manager may have added some floating-rate private secured debt or bank loans (subject to the credit rating) strategies in order to reduce the market volatility and increase capital preservation within your portfolio.

Finally, all the active strategies would be keeping up a higher-than-normal level of liquidity to quickly rotate back into higher-yielding credit and interest rate risk strategies when they deem it to be safe to do so.

Lonsec as part of our portfolio construction investment process monitors and actively manages the exposure to fixed interest assets taking into account the prevailing market conditions and risks. The current environment has been challenging for fixed interest managers; however, the market volatility will present investment opportunities and at some point, the yields offered from fixed income will warrant further investigation.


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